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A. Intestate Succession-Release of an Expectancy
B. Wills
C. Fiduciary Administration and Estate Planning
II. TRUSTS




As in the past, the subject matter will be discussed under the
headings indicated above. The developments of the year1 consist of
court decisions only, as the Tennessee legislature was not in general
session.
I. DEDFiNTS' EsTATEs
A. Intestate Succession-Release of an Expectancy
Does the law give recognition to a purported transfer by an heir
apparent of his expectancy? An assignment of an expectancy must be
distinguished from an assignment of an interest in the estate after
the death of the source. The question concerning the transfer of an
expectancy can arise either in the case of a release to the source by
the heir apparent, or by his assignment to another.
Despite the fact that expectant distributees could not at common
law alienate their interests either (a) because an expectancy was
not an appropriate subject matter of assignment, since it was not an
interest in being,2 or (b) because such an assignment was a fraud on
the ancestor, or (c) because it was regarded as a wagering transaction
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Member, Nashville and Tennessee Bars.
1. The year covered by this article is the calendar year 1962. This is the first time
that the Tennessee Survey articles in this Review have been written on the basis of
calendar year developments. The decisions discussed are only those published in the
Southwestern Reporter, Second Series, during the calendar year 1962.
2. Hite v. Hite, 120 Ohio St. 953, 166 N.E. 193 (1929); AT=INSON, WILLS 725
(2d ed. 1953).
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and so opposed to public policy, or (d) because such transfers were
regarded as being opposed to the policy of the law as expressed in
the wills statute and the statute of intestate succession, and for other
reasons, this device has nevertheless come to be used often in family
settlements. By the prevailing view, a release or a transfer by an heir
apparent or distributee during the lifetime of the source is effective in
equity if made for a fair consideration. 3 In the case of a release by the
heir apparent to the source in the latter's lifetime, however, some
interesting and difficult problems arise concerning the theory on
which this result is reached.
4
Hamilton v. McKinney5 involved a sale contract between a mother
and daughter in which the mother agreed to purchase from the daugh-
ter "all legally owned and inheritance rights" in a house and lot in
Memphis for $20,000. The mother had paid $3,000 of this amount
upon execution of the contract and had executed notes and a deed of
trust for the balance. The mother later executed an affidavit asserting
that this was intended as a gift transaction and that she rescinded
and cancelled the notes and deed of trust; the mother also wrote a will
in which she gave her entire estate to her son. This is an action
brought after the mother's death by the son against the daughter to
have the notes and deed of trust cancelled and surrendered. The
defendant filed an answer and cross-bill seeking to have the house
and lot sold to satisfy the claim. The chancellor held for the de-
fendant and cross-complainant and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court relied upon well-established Tennessee precedent' to hold
that "an heir may by contract with his ancestor relinquish his ex-
pectancy in the latter's estate, and that the contract, if fairly made,
as for a valuable consideration, will be enforced; the releasor will be
precluded afterwards from setting up a claim to any part of his
ancestor's estate."7
It seems clear that both mother and daughter recognized that the
daughter had an equitable interest in the property in addition to her
expectancy; they had operated a boarding house together for several
years, and the contract between them recited a purchase of "all legally
owned and inheritance rights to the property .. ... The result
3. Anderson v. Forbes, 169 Tenn. 223, 228, 84 S.W.2d 104, 105-06 (1935); 3
AiaN=cAN LAW OF PROPFTY § 14.12 (Casner ed. 1952); ATKINSON, WILLS 725 (2d
ed. 1953); Evans, Certain Evasive and Protective Devices Affecting Succession to
Decedents' Estates, 32 MIcH. L. REv. 478, 488-98 (1934).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. 49 Tenn. App. 556, 357 S.V.2d 348 (W.S. 1962).
6. Anderson v. Forbes, 169 Tenn. 223, 84 S.W.2d 104 (1935); Gore v. Howard, 94
Tenn. 577, 30 S.W. 730 (1895); Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 III. 296, 111 N.E. 106
(1915); Eissler v. Hoppel, 158 Ind. 82, 62 N.E. 692 (1902); Coffman v. Coffman, 41
W. Va. 8, 23 S.E. 523 (1895).
7. 49 Tenn. App. at 585, 357 S.W.2d at 361.
8. Id. at 563, 357 S.W.2d at 352.
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reached by the court in sustaining the daughter's claim seems very
sound. What is significant, however, is that the emphasis was put upon
the release of an expectancy, and the proposition that the releasor will
be precluded afterwards from setting up a claim to any part of his
ancestor's estate.9 The theories upon which releases have been
enforced are somewhat obscure.10 While the position has been taken
that the release completely extinguishes the heir's right to inherit,-"
it has been suggested that the preferable view is to treat the release
as a liquidated advancement, the consideration received being the
amount advanced.n This latter theory would seem to bar children
or other descendants of a releasing heir only when they take per
stirpes.13 It seems clear that if a child effectively releases his ex-
pectancy to a parent, he will be precluded from inheritance as against
other children or issue of the parent, but there is authority that an
only child who releases will nevertheless inherit as against collaterals
of the parent.14 While the result reached in the instant case seems
sound enough, the proposition of law stated by the court 5 seems
much too broad. Instead, it should be recognized that while the
majority of courts give some effect to a release of an expectancy by a
child, there are various theories or bases for this decision, with re-
sulting differences in consequences.
B. Wills
The heir or next of kin who would receive a decedent's property in
case of intestacy is certainly a proper party in interest to contest a
will. If such a person is excluded by a prior, unprobated will, how-
ever, is he a proper party to contest the subsequent will? In a recent
well-considered Michigan case the testatrix had executed a series of
seven consecutive wills in all of which no part of her estate was left
to her heirs and next of kin; it was held that the heirs are nevertheless
proper parties to contest the last will, notwithstanding the possible
effect of prior, duly executed, but unprobated wills by which they are
disinherited.' 6 An excellently written student comment on the case7
considers the conflict of authority on this question and approves the
9. Id. at 585, 357 S.W.2d at 361.
10. Article and treatises cited in note 3 supra.
11. Mires v. Laubenheimer, 271 Ill. 296, 111 N.E. 106 (1915).
12. AnONSON, WILLS 727 (2d ed. 1953).
13. See, e.g., 3 A.MalcAN LAw OF Pnoa'RTY § 14.12, at 595 (Casner ed. 1952).
14. Pylant v. Burns, 153 Ga. 529, 112 S.E. 455 (1922), 21 MICH. L. REv. 100
(1922). See 3 A~mICAN LAW oF Pnora nrT'§ 14.12, at 595-96 (Casner ed. 1952)
and authorities there cited.
15. 49 Tenn. App. at 585, 357 S.W.2d at 361.
16. In re Power's Estate, 362 Mich. 222, 106 N.W.2d 833 (1961), 15 VAND. L.
REv. 308 (1961).
17. 15 VA ND. L. REv. 308 (1961).
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reasoning of the Michigan court that an unprobated will is merely a
"scrap of paper" which may never be probated, or may also be sub-
jected to contest, and therefore is not determinative of the rights of
heirs to contest. A widely recognized Tennessee case, Cowan v.
Walker,8 often cited for a contrary result, would seem to be dis-
tinguishable on the ground that there the prior unprobated will was
assumed to be valid. In that case the court referred to the prior
unprobated will and said that "the due legal execution and publication
of this will and codicil, together with the fact that, at the time of the
execution thereof, the testator was of sound mind and disposing
memory, was shown by uncontroverted testimony."19 The testimony
referred to was presented at the separate, preliminary trial to de-
termine the right of the heir to contest. In such a preliminary trial it
is apparently necessary for the heir, in order not to lose by admission
his right to contest the will offered for probate, to present some evi-
dence to show that he will contest all prior wills which disinherit
him. But this preliminary hearing is not a jury trial to contest the
unprobated will, so that the doctrine of Cowan v. Walker would
seem to be easily avoided.
These principles were involved in the recent case of Donnelly v.
Hendrix,0 although they were not discussed. The decedent executed
a will in regular form in 1951 which disinherited her brother and sole
heir, and gave her entire estate to A; this will had been prepared by
an attorney and properly executed, and was found in decedent's lock
box after her death. However, a letter dated in August 1957 was
found in decedents home; it purported to give her entire estate to B,
thus also disinheriting her brother, the appellant. The letter was
probated in common form as a holographic will and appellant pe-
titioned to contest the 1957 will on the ground that it was planted in
the decedents home after her death. A also petitioned to contest the
1957 will, offered the 1951 will for probate, and prayed that the fact
of contest be certified to the circuit court along with both wills in
order that that court might determine which was the last will of the
decedent. Appellant filed a response to A's petition admitting the
due execution of the 1951 will, repeating his allegation that the 1957
will was a fraud, and averring that he and decedent entered into a
contract in 1955 to make reciprocal wills, and that he believed de-
cedent performed this contract by executing a valid will in 1955 which
would revoke the 1951 will. The Probate Court of Shelby County
certified both the 1951 will and the 1957 will to the circuit court for
contest and expressly authorized appellant to contest both. During
18. 117 Tenn. 135, 96 S.W. 967 (1906).
19. Id. at 140, 96 S.W. at 968.
20. 49 Tenn. App. 361, 355 S.W.2d 116 (W.S. 1960).
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the trial appellant offered considerable evidence attacking the 1957
will, admitted the due execution of the 1951 will, but was never able
to show the execution of a will by decedent in 1955. At the conclusion
of all the proof the circuit court directed a verdict against appellant
on the ground that he was no longer a proper party to contest the
validity of either the 1957 will or the 1951 will. After a jury verdict
in favor of the 1951 will, appellant appealed from the order excluding
him from the case prior to its submission to the jury. The Western
Section of the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court
on the ground that appellant conceded the due execution of the 1951
will and was unable to offer evidence showing that this will was sub-
sequently revoked.
The question arises whether the jury could upon any hypothesis
find against both wills. If so, it would seem that a directed verdict
should not have been entered. While appellant admitted the due
execution of the 1951 will, he did not admit its current efficacy. As-
suming, however, a sound result in this case, there is language in the
opinion that because appellant was disinherited under both wills, he
was not a proper party in interest to contest in the 1957 will. This
seems wrong. While the court in the instant case did not even cite
Cowan v. Walker, the decisions in that case and in the current case
were based upon what was referred to as an admission of the validity
of the prior unprobated will. It is believed that an heir or next of kin
has a constitutional right to test the validity of a will offered for
probate regardless of the number of prior unprobated wills which
disinherit him, so long as he does not admit the validity of the prior
unprobated wills; this would seem to be the weight and trend of
current authority in the United States.2'
In the original opinion as published in the advance sheet the court
in Donnelly v. Hendrix also said that where the last of two inconsist-
ent wills is destroyed by the testator in his lifetime, the effect of the
revocation is to restore the prior will.22 This was questionable, as it is
said elsewhere to be well settled in Tennessee that the mere revoca-
tion of a subsequent inconsistent or revocatory will does not of itself
revive a former will; it is a question of intention without any pre-
sumption for or against revival.23 This follows the rule of the eccle-
siastical courts on revival, rather than the rule of the common law
21. See In re Powers Estate, 362 Mich. 222, 106 N.W.2d 833 (1961); ATKINSON,
Wnis 518-20 (2d ed. 1953) and authorities there cited; 15 VAND. L. REV. 308
(1961) and authorities there cited.
22. 355 S.W.2d at 120 (Adv. Sheet Apr. 24, 1962) (citing 2 GREENLEAF, EvmEN CE §
683 and 1 J~AmL&, WmLs 123).
23. Wrinkle v. Williams, 37 Tenn. App. 27, 260 S.W.2d 304 (E.S. 1953); Haven
v. Wrinkle, 29 Tenn. App. 195, 195 S.W.2d 787 (E.S. 1945); Ewell v. Rucker, 28
Tenn. App. 156, 187 S.W.2d 644 (E.S. 1945); 1 PMncnHn, WILLS AND ADMINSmTRA-
TIoN oF ESTATES 280 (3d ed. Phillips 1955) and cases cited.
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courts stated in the instant case. The statement has been deleted
from the opinion as it appears in the bound version of the South-
western Reporter and in the official reports,24 thus bringing the case
into line with Tennessee precedent.
Arnold v. Marcom'-5 held that after a will had been certified to the
circuit court for contest and the issues made up, the contestants can-
not dismiss the suit or withdraw from the case and thereby prevent a
determination of the issues over the objections of the proponent. In
1959 the will contest was heard before judge and jury; evidence was
introduced showing due execution, and contestant introduced evi-
dence to prove that the instrument was not the decedent's last will,
and then contestant-defendant moved the court for permission to take
a voluntary non-suit without prejudice, which motion was granted.
Nevertheless, when the contestant filed a subsequent petition in
1960 to contest the will, it was dismissed and this result was affirmed
by the court of appeals for the middle section on the ground that the
1959 dismissal was res judicata. This result was based upon what ap-
pears to be sound precedent holding that such proceedings are in
rem and therefore there are no parties who can withdraw or take a
non-suit and thus put the matter where it was at the start, as is true in
actions between individuals. It is also said that all persons interested
have the right to be made parties, the proceeding being in rem,
and the judgment is binding on all persons, whether parties to the
record or not.27 If this is true, it would seem that the circuit court
erred in its 1959 order granting the contestant's motion to be per-
mitted to take a voluntary non-suit without prejudice. Even though
the circuit court erred in granting this motion, its order is held to be
res judicata sustaining the validity of the will-a strange result indeedl
Arp v. Wolfe simply holds that the trial court did not err in (1)
refusing to direct a verdict in favor of proponent of the will, and (2)
in refusing to set aside a verdict against the will. In will contests, as
in other litigation tried by a jury, it is proper to direct a verdict only
where one conclusion can be reasonably inferred from the evidence.
Here there was conflicting and substantial evidence.
C. Fiduciary Administration and Estate Planning
When a decedent makes a testamentary gift of real estate subject
to a mortgage, is the executor required to pay the mortgage debt,
24. 49 Tenn. App. at 370, 355 S.W.2d at 120.
25. 49 Tenn. App. 161, 352 S.W.2d 936 (M.S. 1961).
26. Larus v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 149 Tenn. 126, 147-48, 257 S.W. 94,
100-01 (1923) and cases there cited.
27. Id. at 148, 257 S.W. at 101. The court quoted from the Larus case in the
instant case, 352 S.W.2d at 939.
28. 49 Tenn. App. 294, 354 S.W.2d 799 (E.S. 1956).
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or does the devisee receive the property subject to the debt? This
is an important problem in estate planning today. The result can be
either way depending on what the testator intends, and the significant
point is that the estate planner should make sure that the testator is
aware of the problem so that he can formulate an actual intent.
Fiduciaries are experiencing a considerable amount of litigation be-
cause of a failure to deal with this problem explicitly.
In Wilson v. Smith, 9 H bought a farm subject to a mortgage debt,
which he assumed. His will gave to W, his wife, all his personalty
and a life estate in his real estate. At the date of H's death the farm
was still subject to a mortgage debt. W was also appointed as
executrix of his estate, and the first item of his will directed the pay-
ment of all his debts. W settled the estate and used the income from
the farm to pay off the mortgage debt. When W died, her executrices
brought this petition to determine whether her estate is entitled to
reimbursement from the remainder beneficiaries under H's will for the
amount of the mortgage debt, because it was paid off by W from her
income interest. Both the trial court and the western section of the
court of appeals held for the remainder beneficiaries, against W's
estate. The court seemed to have been impressed variously with
the facts (1) that the personalty in H's estate amounted to several
times the amount of the debt, (2) that the will directed the payment
of debts first, and (3) that the statutes forbid the sale of real property
until the personal estate is exhausted. The court seems to say that,
absent a direction otherwise in the will, an executor is under a duty
to pay off a mortgage debt, and the mortgagee who fails to file a claim
against the mortgagor's estate elects to be satisfied with the security
alone. This is indeed a problem which should be thought through
carefully and especially provided for; otherwise the fiduciary adminis-
tration is likely to be involved with litigable construction problems.
American National Bank & Trust Co. v. MacFarland3 involved a
significant question concerning the Tennessee Inheritance Tax exemp-
tion of $40,000; the problem had been much discussed in estate plan-
ning circles. The testator had life insurance policies in the amount of
$26,385 made payable to his executors and used apt words, as is
necessary under the insurance statute,3' to make them subject to
29. 360 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
30. 352 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1961).
31. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1108 (1956); Crockett v. Webb, 195 Tenn. 88, 257
S.W.2d 4 (1953); American Trust & Banking Co. v. Twinam, 187 Tenn. 570, 216
S.W.2d 314 (1948). It is held that if a widow or children survive, insurance proceeds
payable to one's estate will nevertheless go to the widow and/or children if the words
in the will are worded in general terms disposing of "all my estate." American Trust
Co. v. Sperryj 157 Tenn. 43, 5 S.W.2d 957 (1928); Chrisman v. Chrisman, 141 Tenn.
424, 210 S.W. 783 (1918). Is it advisable to use apt words in both the will and the
policy? Will either suffice?
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claims against his estate and the provisions of his will. His will gave
his residuary estate to trustees of two trusts for his wife, son and
grandsona2 -beneficiaries who would be Class A under the Tennessee
Inheritance Tax statute. The executors claimed the life insurance
as exempt from the inheritance tax. Tennessee Code Annotated sec-
tion 30-1604 provides that life insurance shall be included in the gross
estate, except "that there shall be exempt.., proceeds of such policies
as may be payable to class A beneficiaries of the decedent and/or to a
trustee... for such, to the extent of forty thousand dollars ($40,000).
." The commissioner of finance and taxation denied the claimed
exemption because the insurance was payable to neither class A
beneficiaries nor to a trustee for such. The executors paid the addi-
tional tax and brought this action for a refund. In affirming the chan-
cellor, the supreme court held that because the insurance proceeds
were commingled with other estate assets and made subject to claims
and charges, they lost their identity as life insurance proceeds and
became a part of decedent's general residuary estate; this loss of
identity was held to cause the loss of the tax exemption limited to
insurance proceeds, even though the residuary remaining after pay-
ment of debts and claims was given to trustees for class A benefici-
aries.
The decision seems to be an accurate interpretation of the statute
as written. It would seem, however, that the statute ought to be
revised either (1) to allow the exemption regardless of how the
insurance is made payable, or (2) to not allow the exemption at all,
as in the development of the federal statute upon which the Ten-
nessee statute was based.3 It does not seem logical to limit the tax
exemption to insurance payable otherwise than to the executor or to
the estate being administered in probate. There is in fact a genuine
need for some insurance to be made payable to the executor so that
he can have the cash with which to pay claims, expenses of adminis-
tration, and taxes; otherwise estate assets will have to be sold to
outsiders in order to provide such cash. The statute as presently
written produces complex and circuitous means of avoidance and in a
sense discriminates against the great majority of people, who are of
modest means. A person with more than $40,000 of life insurance
can have that amount made payable to class A beneficiaries or to a
trust for them, and have the balance made payable to his executor
32. While the opinion is not explicit, it indicates that one of the trusts was a
:formula marital deduction trust under § 2056 of the United States Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, while the other was a non-marital deduction trust.
33. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 30-1604, -1609 (1956).
34. Section 402(f) of the Revenue Act of 1918 taxed life insurance payable to
beneficiaries other than the executor "to the extent of the excess over $40,000." See
"NVAnEN & SunaEY, FEDERAL ESTATE AND Gn'r TAxAnoN 484-501 (1961 ed.).
Compare INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2042, which contains no such exemption.
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without incurring a tax penalty.3 Likewise, a person with less than
$40,000 of life insurance can establish a revocable inter vivos life
insurance trust for class A beneficiaries, authorizing the trustee to
purchase estate assets from the executor to provide the needed cash
liquidity, and then have a "pour-over" clause in his will giving his
residuary estate to the trustee of the inter vivos trust. Perhaps there
are other arrangements which will save the tax exemption and still
provide the executor with the needed cash. Thus, tax avoidance can
be arranged. While it is true that the allowance of a $40,000 exemp-
tion for life insurance made subject to probate plus the allowed
deductions for probate expenses may seem like a double deduction to
the extent that such insurance is used for probate expenses, people
are getting this result now by the circuitous route of the life insurance
trust. It would certainly be more convenient to have such insurance
paid to the executor, and such convenience in fiduciary administration
ought not to incur either a tax penalty or increased probate expenses.
Perhaps this adds up to an argument for (1) the elimination of the
life insurance tax exemption, and (2) the calculation of probate fees
upon the basis of the tax concept of "gross estate" rather than the
ancient and somewhat unrealistic concept known as the "probate
estate." It seems highly questionable that a tax exemption of $40,000
should exist with respect to life insurance proceeds, whereas only
$10,000 is allowed with respect to other assets. There ought not,
however, to be a tax benefit for doing indirectly through extra, com-
plicating and more expensive means what could be done more simply
and conveniently through the executor without any substantial loss
to the public revenue. This would seem to be a matter for the legis-
lature to consider.
II. TRUSTS
Trustees owe a duty of loyalty and partiality to their trust bene-
ficiaries. The nature of the relationship requires the fiduciary to act
only for the benefit of the real owners-the beneficiaries. The trustee
may not deal with the property so as to benefit himself directly or
indirectly. Because of the likelihood of inside knowledge about busi-
ness and property values, because human nature is frail, and because
it is often difficult for the beneficiary to prove profit to the fiduciary,
this duty of loyalty becomes frequently a flat prohibition against any
transaction involving a conflict of interest. A frequent application of
35. Whether or not such planning will increase probate expenses or increase the
chances of a widow's dissent from the will are additional matters to be considered
and planned in each case. See Beatty, Insurance Proceeds in Trust, 28 TENN. L. REv.
344 (1961).
36. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 30-1609 (1956).
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this duty arises in the case of a sale by the fiduciary of his own
property to the trust, or the converse, the purchase of estate or trust
property by the fiduciary. It is now well settled in the United States,
as well as in England, that a sale by a trustee to himself can be set
aside if it was made without the consent of the beneficiaries, even
though it was made in good faith and for a fair consideration.37 On
the other hand, where the beneficiary consents to the sale and is sui
juris, the sale will not be set aside if the trustee made a full disclosure
and did not induce the sale by taking advantage of his relation to the
beneficiaries or by other improper conduct, and if the transaction was
in all respects fair and reasonable.- However, the sale can be set
aside if the trustee did not make a full disclosure, or if he improperly
induced the sale, or if the transaction was not fair and reasonable. 39
The consent of the beneficiary will not preclude him from avoiding
the sale if he did not have knowledge of his legal rights and of all
relevant facts that the trustee knew or should have known.40 The
relation between the trustee and beneficiary is such that the trustee
must not in any way take advantage of his position. The parties are
not dealing at arm's length and the trustee is bound to consider first
the interest of the beneficiary.
If the trustee is dealing with the beneficiary on his own account,
the transaction can also be set aside if it is not a fair transaction.
Thus where the trustee with the consent of the beneficiary sells trust
property to himself individually, it is not enough that the beneficiary
had full knowledge of all the facts and of his legal rights, and that his
consent was not improperly induced by the trustee. It is essential
also that the sale should be at a price which is fair and reasonable.41
The situation is different from that which arises where the beneficiary
consents to a sale of trust property to a third person, in which case
the mere fact that the property is sold at less than is fair value is not
of itself a sufficient ground for setting aside the sale.
These principles were involved in Creighton v. Hayes42 in which
the Supreme Court of Tennessee seems to go quite far to put its
blessing on a purchase by the trustees of a beneficiary's stock in a
family corporation largely on the basis that the beneficiary was sui
37. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Lebanon Bank & Trust Co., 28 Tenn. App. 618,
192 S.W.2d 245 (1946); Cowan v. Hamilton Nat'l Bank, 177 Tenn. 94, 115, 146
S.W.2d 359 (1941); Tisdale v. Tisdale, 34 Tenn. 333, 340 (1855); 2 Scott, TRUsTs §
170.1, at 1196 (2d ed. 1956), and cases there cited. Compare the fiduciary duty of
the corporate manager as analogous in Gillespie v. Branham, 47 Tenn. App. 234, 337
S.W.2d 689 (1959).
38. 2 ScoTr, TRusTs § 170.1, at 1197 (2d ed. 1956), and cases there cited.
39. Ibid. See also id. § 216.3 and authorities cited.
40. Id. § 216.3.
41. Id. § 216.3, at 1601.
42. 354 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1962).
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juris. The court does not seem to be sufficiently concerned with the
other requisites, i.e., whether the price was fair and reasonable,
whether the beneficiary had knowledge of all relevant facts that the
trustee knew or should have known, or whether or not the beneficiary
was induced by improper conduct of the trustees. In all these cases
the burden of proof is upon the trustee to show that he did not take
advantage of his position as trustee.43
The father died in 1926 and his will bequeathed all his stock in the
Foster & Creighton Company to two of his sons as trustees to hold
for the life of the survivor of the trustees for the benefit of all five of
his children. It was provided that the trustees should have the power
to vote the stock, to divide the cash dividends equally among the
five children "or the issue, per stirpes, of any that may be dead," and
to sell the stock for cash and terminate the trust. Other than as a
result of a sale of all the stock, the trust apparently was intended to
continue until death of the surviving trustee, whereupon distribution
would be made to the five children or to the issue per stirpes of any
that may be dead. In 1927 the trustees purchased the one-fifth
beneficial interest of a brother in an oral transaction for $5,000. No
court approval was obtained and no written memorandum of the
terms was made. Twenty-one years later, however, there apparently
was some concern about the validity of the sale, and during this
period the stock had increased greatly in value and had paid large
dividends; a release and quitclaim deed was executed by the brother-
beneficiary and his three children. The brother-beneficiary died in
1953; there apparently was some feeling on the part of his issue that
they had a separate future interest which was not disposed when their
father entered into the sale. This caused the trustees to file a bill in
the chancery court making a report and an accounting of their ad-
ministration over thirty-four years. The chancery court held that the
purchase by the trustees was valid and that the children of the
brother who sold had no rights in the trust. On appeal the supreme
court affirmed, influenced largely by the release and quitclaim deed
signed in 1948. The court said that there are literally thousands of
cases from every jurisdiction in the United States, including Tennes-
see, which prohibit the purchase of trust property by the trustee,
not on the basis of actual fraud, but to avoid the possibility of fraud
and to emphasize the idea that a trustee must not put himself in a
position where his private profit will oppose the interest of the estate.4
The court said that this very sound principle is subject to numerous
exceptions, however, one of which is that where the beneficiary is
capable of taking part in the transaction, the trustee may make a
43. 2 ScoTT, TRusTs § 170.1, at 1198 (2d ed. 1956).




It is believed that the court does not well justify its result in terms
of a rule and the exceptions to a rule. Instead, as indicated above,
the authorities seem to be that in addition to showing that the bene-
ficiary is sui juris, the burden of proof is on the trustees to show that
the price was fair and reasonable, that when he gave his consent the
beneficiary had knowledge of all relevant facts, that the trustee knew
or should have known and of his legal rights, and that he was not
induced by improper conduct of the trustee, whatever may be "im-
proper." If the court in the instant case was satisfied that these
requirements were met, as it apparently was, it would have done well
to have emphasized the fairness of the transaction when made rather
than the legal capacity of the beneficiary to deal. It seems clear
that the settlor had more confidence in the business acumen and
management ability of the two trustee sons that he did in the bene-
ficiary-son who sold, and the court ought not by its emphasis on sui
juris capacity, ratification and estoppel, lend encouragement to trustees
to deal at arm's length with beneficiaries, even though the latter have
legal capacities to deal.
III. FuTuR INTERESTS
A. Alternative Gifts
In Creighton v. Hayes 6 discussed above, the beneficiaries are "my
aforesaid five children or the issue, per stirpes, of any that may be
dead." Absent a sale of the close corporation stock which constitutes
the trust corpus, the trust apparently is to terminate on the death
of the surviving trustee. One child sold his beneficial interest to the
trustees and died in 1953. Did the sale by the child-beneficiary in
1927 also dispose of the alternative interest of his issue (1) after his
death, and (2) upon final termination of the trust? The opinion in-
dicates that the chancellor held that the appellants, who were issue
of the beneficiary who sold, "had no rights herein," and that all neces-
sary persons had been made parties to the suit, although it does not
appear that guardians ad litem had been appointed for unknown and
unborn issue. The supreme court affirmed the decision that the
appellants had no interest in the accounting proceeding, and it held
that the issue of living beneficiaries had no present interest in the
administration of the trust. The court then said that "the only
possible interest which they have or might have . . . is the highly
contingent remainder interest which is so contingent that it amounts
45. Ibid.
46. 354 S.W.2d 73 (Tenn. 1962).
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to a mere expectancy."47 This is a remarkably unconvincing state-
ment by the court.
The testator made his gift to his five children "or the issue, per
stirpes, of any that may be dead." The property interests given are
(1) the income interest during the term of the trust, and (2) the
corpus gift upon the termination of the trust. The gift to the issue
seems clearly to be an alternative gift effective upon the death of a
child of the testator.48 The court in the instant case seems to feel that
the release and quitclaim signed in 1948 by the child-beneficiary and
also by his three children, who were the appellants here, was sufficient
to dispose of the alternative future interest intended by the testator
to be effective on death. While neither the terms of the release and
quitclaim nor the basic fairness of this self-dealing by the trustees
with respect to the issue of the child-beneficiary are set forth and
considered in the opinion, the satisfaction expressed by the court is
not persuasive. Was the alternative contingent future interest of the
issue of the child-beneficiary purchased fairly and properly by the
admittedly self-dealing trustees in 1948? Suppose that one or more of
the present appellants should die before the termination of the trust,
leaving children who will be issue of the selling child-beneficiary-
has their interest under the will of their ancestor been transferred to
the trustees?
B. Class Gifts
In McCarley v. McCarley,49 the supreme court graciously construed
the word "grandchildren" to mean only those grandchildren living
at the death of the testatrix. In so doing the court saved the gift
from being utterly void as a violation of the rule against perpetuities,
and it probably approximated quite closely the actual intention of
the testatrix. The testamentary gift was in trust, the income to be
used exclusively for the college education of her grandchildren; it
was provided that when "the last grandchild has completed college,"
the estate should be divided between her two sons. At her death
testatrix left two sons, one of whom was 36 years of age with three
children ranging from 6 to 13 years; the other son was 33 years of age
with two children, ages 1 and 4. It was argued that since the sons
are legally presumed to be capable of having children as long as they
live, a class gift was created with fluctuating membership to include
grandchildren born after the death of the testatrix, and that since it is
not clear that "the last grandchild" would "complete college" within
47. Id. at 77.
48. See 5 AumERcAN LA~v oF PoERTY § 21.24 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEMErN,
PnoPERTY § 252 (1940).
49. 360 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. 1962).
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twenty-one years after the death of the sons, the gift was entirely
void. The court obviated this argument by construing "grandchil-
dren" to mean only those living at the death of the testatrix. This
made sense, said the court, because the ultimate gift upon termination
was to her two sons, and this would be impossible if the trust had
to be held open during their complete lives; such an interpretation of
the word "grandchildren" would put her in the absurd position of
making a gift to her sons which neither could ever receive. The
decision seems to be well-reasoned and the opinion well-written.
While the result may exclude some grandchildren born to these com-
paratively young sons, this is an estate planning problem to be
worked out in designing the will, rather than curative work to be
accomplished by the courts.
